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Recent Decisions
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE- CORPORATIONS- WORK PROD-
UCT DOCTRINE- ADMINISTRATIVE SUMMONSES-The Supreme
Court of the United States, in a unanimous decision, has held
that the control group test for determining the applicability of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context is overly
restrictive and that any future application of the privilege must
be on a case by case basis. The Court also held that the work
product doctrine is applicable to administrative summonses.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
In January, 1976, the Upjohn Company hired independent ac-
countants to conduct an audit of one of its foreign subsidiaries.
The audit disclosed that the subsidiary had made payments to or
for the benefit of foreign government officials in order to secure
government business. This finding was communicated to Mr.
Gerard Thomas, Upjohn's General Counsel.' Thomas then con-
sulted with outside counsel and with Upjohn's Chairman of the
Board. As a result, the company conducted an internal investiga-
tion of what it termed "questionable payments." As a part of this
investigation, Upjohn's counsel prepared and sent a letter, sign-
ed by the Chairman of the Board, containing a questionnaire to
all foreign general and area managers.2 The managers were in-
structed to treat the investigation as highly confidential and not
to discuss it with anyone except Upjohn employees who might be
helpful in providing the requested information. Thomas and out-
side counsel also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire
and other Upjohn officers and employees as part of the internal
1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
2. Id. The letter began by noting recent disclosures that several
American companies made "possibly illegal" payments to foreign government
officials and emphasized that the management needed full information concern-
ing any such payments by Upjohn. The letter identified Thomas as Upjohn's
general counsel and that he was to conduct an investigation for the purpose of
determining the nature and magnitude of any payments made by the Upjohn
Company or any of its subsidiaries to.any employee or official of a foreign
government. Id. at 386-87.
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investigation.3
In March, 1976, the company voluntarily submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a preliminary report
which disclosed certain questionable payments.4 A copy of the
report was also submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
which initiated an investigation to determine the tax conse-
quences of the payments. Upjohn furnished a list of all
employees interviewed and those who responded to question-
naires to the IRS.'
In November, 1976, the IRS issued a summons pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 76026 demanding production of all of Upjohn's in-
vestigatory files, including the questionnaires and interview
memoranda relative to the investigation conducted under the
supervision of Gerard Thomas.' Upjohn declined to produce the
documents,8 claiming that they were protected by the attorney-
3. Id. The responses to the questionnaire were to be sent directly to
Thomas. Id. at 387.
4. Id. An updated amendment, disclosing further payments, was submit-
ted by Upjohn on July 26, 1976. Id. at 387 n.1.
5. Id. at 387.
6. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 provides, in relevant part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return . . . [or]
determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax ...
the Secretary is authorized . . . (1) To examine any books, papers,
records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax . . . or any officer or employee of
such person .... or any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to
appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons
and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give
such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such in-
quiry ...
26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1967).
7. 449 U.S. at 388.
8. Id. Upjohn did provide the IRS with details of $700,000.00 worth of
payments which it conceded might have affected its federal income tax liability.
However, the company furnished the IRS considerably less detailed information
regarding another $3,700,000.00 worth of questionable payments claiming that
these payments did not affect its tax liability. Although the company made its
employees available for questioning by the IRS, the company refused to permit
questions about the $3,700,000.00 worth of payments. The IRS claimed that the
company's limited disclosure was inadequate and did not permit an independent
evaluation by the IRS of the possible tax implications of the payments. Accord-
ingly, the IRS issued the summons which became the subject of this appeal. Up-
john v. United States, 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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client privilege9 and constituted the work product'" of an at-
torney prepared in anticipation of litigation."
The United States filed a petition seeking enforcement of the
summons in August, 1977, in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan. The district court held that
the summons should be enforced because Upjohn had waived the
attorney-client privilege by submitting its reports to the SEC.'2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted a
"control group test,"'3 holding that those communications made
by officers and agents who were not responsible for directing the
company's actions in response to legal advice were not privileg-
ed." The appeals court also stated that the work product doc-
trine does not apply to administrative summonses."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'" and
reversed." Without dissent, the Court rejected the use of any
test for the application of the corporate attorney-client
privilege.'8 Instead, the Court held that, based on the facts of
this particular case, the communications were protected by the
attorney-client privilege because they were made by corporate
employees to counsel for the corporation, at the direction of cor-
porate superiors, to secure legal advice from counsel, and
because the employees were aware that they were being ques-
9. 449 U.S. at 388. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2292 (McNaughton
Rev. 1961). Wigmore states that the attorney-client privilege is applicable:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal ad-
visor, (8) except the protection be waived.
10. 449 U.S. at 388. Work product includes interview, statements,
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
other tangible and intangible materials prepared by the attorney on behalf of
his client. Generally, the Work Product Doctrine protects the invasion of the at-
torney's privacy in the preparation and representation of his client. See
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
11. 449 U.S. at 388.
12. Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 69 & 70.
14. 449 U.S. at 388-89.
15. Id. at 389.
16. 445 U.S. 925 (1980).
17. 449 U.S. at 402.
18. Id. at 386, 396-97.
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tioned so that the corporation could secure legal advice. 9 Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court held that the work product doctrine
was applicable to administrative summonses.0
Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the court, observ-
ed that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the existence of a
privilege is based on common law principles as interpreted by
the courts. 1 Recognizing that the attorney-client privilege is one
of the oldest privileges for confidential communications known to
the common law, the Court noted that it was developed to en-
courage full and frank communications between attorneys and
their clients, thereby promoting broader public interest in the
observance of law and the administration of justice." Noting that
the government did not contest the general proposition that the
attorney-client privilege was applicable to corporations, the
Court observed that it had in the past assumed that the
privilege applied to corporations.3
The Court then addressed the court of appeals' determination
that because in the corporate context the client is an inanimate
entity, the privilege only protects disclosures made by senior
19. Id. at 386, 394.
20. Id. at 386, 397.
21. Id. at 389. Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which relates to privileges,
has left the problem of applying the attorney-client privilege up to the courts
by providing:
Except as otherwise required by-the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Acts of Congress or in Rules by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
state or political subdivision thereof, shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the Courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be deter-
mined in accordance with state law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
22. 449 U.S. at 389. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
(privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that
relates to the. client's reasons for seeking representation); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (purpose of the privilege was recognized as encourag-
ing clients to make full disclosures to their attorneys); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128
U.S. 464 (1888) (privilege is founded upon necessity, to aid counsel in obtaining
information for advising their clients on matters of law)). See WIGMORE, supra
note 9, § 2290.
23. 449 U.S. at 390 (citing United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
236 U.S. 318 (1915) (attorney-client privilege applies to the corporate client)).
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management who possess an identity analogous to the corpora-
tion as a whole.2 '4 The Court noted that similar reasoning was ad-
vanced in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,25
the first case to articulate the control group test. Justice Rehn-
quist then criticized this reasoning as overlooking the fact that,.
the privilege exists to protect the giving of information to
lawyers to enable them to give sound and informed professional
advice to those who can act on it.2"
The Court concluded that the control group test was unduly
restrictive and that it frustrated the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant
information by employees of the corporate client to attorneys
seeking to render it legal advice.2'7 Further, the Court noted that
the control group test inhibited the efforts of counsel to insure
their clients' compliance with the law28 and that it was difficult to
24. 449 U.S. at 390. See 600 F.2d at 1226.
25. 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied
sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963) (for attorney-client privilege to be applicable, the
employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, must be in a
position to control or to take a substantial part in the decision about any action
which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney).
26. 449 U.S. at 390-91 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 51;
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 391). The Court emphasized that "[tihe first
step to resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background
and sifting through the facts." Id.
27. Id. at 392. The Court noted that for the individual client the provider
of information and the person acting on the lawyer's advice are one and the
same. In corporations, however, the giver of needed relevant information fre-
quently is not the person who can act on the legal advice given as a result of
the information received. Further, the Court observed that it is frequently non-
control group employees who involve the corporation in serious legal difficulties
and that in such cases it becomes vital for the corporate counsel to consult with
these non-control group employees to discover relevant facts upon which to
base his advice to the corporation. Under the control group test such com-
munications would not be protected. Id. at 391-92.
28. Id. at 392-93 The Court stated:
In a corporation, it may be necessary to glean information relevant to a
legal problem from middle management or non-management personnel as
well as from top executives. The attorney dealing with a complex legal
problem is thus faced with a Hobson's choice [e.g. in reality, no choice at
all]. If he interviews employees not having the very highest authority
their communication to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand,
he interviews only those employees with the very highest authority, he
may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine what hap-
1982]
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apply in practice with any degree of predictability. The Court
stated that in order to achieve the purposes of the attorney-
client privilege, the attorney and client must be able to predict
whether their discussions will be privileged and that, therefore,
an uncertain privilege is little better than no privilege at all."
Justice Rehnquist found that the communications at issue
were made by Upjohn employees to counsel for Upjohn acting as
such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure
legal advice from counsel, and that the information thus given
was not available from upper-level management. Further, the
Court observed that the communications concerned matters
within the scope of the employees' corporate duties and that the
employees were sufficiently aware that they were being ques-
tioned so that the corporation could obtain legal advice." Justice
Rehnquist noted that the communications were considered confi-
dential when made and that the company has maintained this con-
fidentiality. The Court therefore concluded that the communica-
tions must be protected from compelled disclosure to effectuate
the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege.31
The Court then noted the lower court's fear that extending
the privilege to these communications would create a "zone of
silence" over corporate affairs and severely burden discovery. 2
The Court reasoned, however, that because the protection of the
privilege extends only to communications and not to facts within
the client's knowledge, the adversary is in no worse a position
pened. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)
449 U.S. at 391-92 (quoting Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,
608-09 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
29. 449 U.S. at 393. The Court noted that such unpredictability has led to dis-
parate decisions in the federal courts. Id. citing Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1968) (control group includes managers and assistant managers of patent
division and research and development department); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v.
GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85. (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd 478 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1973)(control group includes only division and corporate vice-presidents, and not the
directors of research and vice-presidents of production and research)).
30. 449 U.S. at 394.
31. Id. at 395.
32. Id. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals believed that the subject matter
test encouraged senior managers to ignore vital information regarding possibly
illegal transactions in order to make corporate counsel an exclusive repository
of unpleasant facts. It noted further that when corporate agents are scattered
in several foreign countries that the burden on discovery is severe and thus
creates a large "zone of silence." Id.
278 [Vol. 20:273
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than if the communications had never been made.' The Court
stated that while a party could not be compelled to reveal what
he said to his attorney, the same party cannot conceal a fact
merely by revealing it to his lawyer.34
The Court concluded that although it may be more convenient
for the government if discovery of the requested documents was
allowed, such considerations of convenience do not overcome the
policy served by the attorney-client privilege.35 However, the
Court emphasized that its conclusion applied only to the case be-
fore it and that it did not purport to establish a set of rules gov-
erning challenges to investigatory subpoenas. 6 Justice Rehnquist
noted that such a case-by-case approach, while it may cause some
uncertainty in the area of the attorney-client, privilege, is consis-
tent with the mandate of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 7 The Court did, however, conclude that the control group
test, as adopted by the court below, cannot govern the develop-
ment of the law in this area.'
The Court next considered whether certain notes and memor-
anda made by Upjohn's General Counsel, Thomas, concerning
communications between employees and himself were protected
33. 449 U.S. 395-96. (quoting City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205
F. Supp. 830, 831 (1962) (protection of privilege extends only to communications
not to facts)).
34. 449 U.S. at 396. citing Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at
611) (a communication is not privileged simply because it is made by or to a per-
son who happens to be a lawyer); State ex. rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis.
2d 559, 580, 150 N.W.2d 387, 399 (1967)).
35. 449 U.S. at 396. The Court also rejected the government's argument
that the burden on the government to personally interview the affected Upjohn
employees was too great and that as such the attorney-client privilege had to
yield out of necessity. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 516)
(discovery was not intended to enable counsel to perform its duties on wits bor-
rowed from the adversary).
36. 449 U.S. at 396-97.
37. Id. See supra note 21. The Court supported its refusal to lay down
specific guidelines by reference to the legislative history of Rule 501 in S. Rep.
No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974). 449 U.S. at 396-97 (citing Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. at 47 (1980) (federal rules of evidence acknowledge the
authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of
testimonial privileges, and by enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested an af-
firmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege); United States v. Gillock,
445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980) (Congress enacted Rule 501 to provide the courts with a
greater flexibility in developing the rules of privilege on a case by case basis)).
38. 449 U.S. at 397.
19821 279
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under the work product doctrine.39 The Court examined its deci-
sion in Hickman v. Taylor," which announced the work product
doctrine and explained its importance." Justice Rehnquist
observed that the Hickman Court determined that the interests
of a client and justice are better served if an attorney can work
with a certain degree of privacy."2 He then noted that the
Supreme Court had recently held that the obligation imposed by
a tax summons remained subject to traditional legal privileges
and limitations.43 The Court stated that neither the language of
the IRS summons provisions nor their legislative history sug-
gests that Congress intended to preclude the application of the
work product doctrine to such summonses.44
39. Id. The court of appeals held that the work product doctrine was not
applicable to administrative summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. 7602. See 600
F.2d at 1228 n.1. The Government conceded that the court of appeals had erred
on this point. 449 U.S. at 397.
40. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the administrator of a deceased
seaman brought a wrongful death action against a tug boat company and its
owner and sought discovery of all written statements and memoranda of oral
statements which defendant's counsel had taken of witness-employees. These
employees were the only witnesses to the accident. The Court held that only a
showing of substantial need and inability to obtain information by other means
would justify disclosure of attorney's work product. Id. at 511 & 512.
41. 449 U.S. at 387 & 398.
42. Id. See 329 U.S. at 510. The Hickman Court held that any attempt
without compelling necessity and justification to secure written statements,
memoranda, and personal recollections prepared or formed by a party's counsel
in the course of his legal duties must fail. The Hickman Court feared disclosure
would result in inefficiency and unfairness to a client and that it would affect
the giving of legal advice and the attorney's preparation of cases for trial. As
such, the Court concluded that the interest of the clients and the cause of
justice would suffer substantially if such documents were readily discoverable.
Id. at 511. See also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975) (work
product doctrine shelters the mental processes of an attorney, providing a
privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case).
43. 449 U.S. at 398-99. (quoting United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714
(1980) (summonses under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 are subject to traditional privileges
and limitations)).
44. 449 U.S. at 398-99. Rule 81(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which makes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to summons en-
forcement proceedings, provides in pertinent part:
These rules apply to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or
production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an of-
ficer or agency of the United States under any statute of the United
States except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district
court or by order of the court in the proceedings.
FED. R. CIV. P. § 1(a)(3).
The Court quoted the pertinent part of Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
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The government contended that despite the work product doc-
trine's applicability to the IRS summonses, a sufficient showing
of necessity to overcome its protection had been made in this
case. Justice Rehnquist noted that although Hickman v. Taylor
contained language indicating that production might be justified
upon a showing that the witnesses are no longer available or
may be reached only with difficulty, this proviso has never been
used to expose to discovery a witness' oral statements that are
now in the form of the attorney's mental impressions or memor-
anda." The Court observed that Rule 26(b) (3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure" provides special protection to work
product that reveals an attorney's mental processes and requires
a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain information
without undue hardship before documents constituting attorney
work product can be disclosed."'
Observing that some courts have held that no showing of
necessity can overcome the protection of work product based on
oral statements of witnesses, the Court explicitly stated that it is
Civil Procedure, which, codifies the work product doctrine, as follows:
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things other-
wise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of thie Rule and prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative, (including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of this
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
the litigation.
Id. at 398, n.7.
45. 449 U.S. at 399. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 512-13) (it
would be a rare situation in which the production of an attorney's memoranda
of written oral statements would be discoverable); (citing United States v.
Nobles, 442 U.S. at 238-39) (work product doctrine shelters the mental processes
of an attorney and materials prepared by the attorney's agents).
46. See supra note 44.
47. 449 U.S. at 400-01. The Court concluded that although Rule 26 does not
specifically refer to memoranda based on oral statements, such material must
be protected from compelled disclosure. Id. at 400. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. at 512-13. (forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all that a witness has
told him gives rise to grave inaccuracies because the statement contains what
he remembered or saw fit to write down and would make the attorney more of
a witness than an officer of the court and invade his mental processes).
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not deciding such an issue in Upjohn.8 The Court held only that
the federal magistrate applied the wrong standard in concluding
that the government had overcome the protections of the work
product doctrine and that this case required a far stronger show-
ing, by the government, of necessity and unavailability by other
means.49 Because the court of appeals thought that the work pro-
duct doctrine was inapplicable in an administrative summonses
enforcement proceeding, and because the district court erred in
applying the wrong standard of protection, the Court reversed
and remanded to the court of appeals for proceedings not incon-
sistent with its opinion. 50
In an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment, Chief Justice Burger agreed with the Court's rejection of
the control group test but strongly criticized the Court for its
failure to adopt some standards to afford guidance to corporate
clients, their attorneys, and the federal courts in this area. 1 He
then proceeded to set down guidelines52 which, as a general rule,
would enable corporate clients, their attorneys, and the courts to
predict, with some degree of certainty, whether or not specific
communications would be protected.' Chief Justice Burger main-
48. 449 U.S. at 401. (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp.
943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (notes of conversation with witnesses are so much a
product of the lawyer's thinking and offer so little probative value of the
witnesses' actual words that they are absolutely protected from disclosure));
(citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973) (personal
recollections, notes and memoranda pertaining to conversation with witness
protected from disclosure)).
49. 449 U.S. at 401. The magistrate applied the "substantial need" and
"without undue hardship" standard. The Upjohn Court, however, found that
Hickman and Rule 26 clearly demonstrated that these memoranda cannot be
disclosed without a showing of something more than substantial need and un-
due hardship. Id.
50. Id. at 401-02.
51. 449 U.S. at 402 (Burger, C.J.,. concurring).
52. Id. at 402-03. (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d at 609); (citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Miliken, 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1163-65 (D.S.C. 1974)); (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970)). Justice Burger stated:
[I]n my view, the Court should make clear now that, as a general rule, a
communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or former
employee speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney
regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment.
The attorney must be one authorized by the management to inquire into
the subject and must be seeking information to assist counsel in perform-
ing any of the following functions: (a) Evaluating whether the employee's
[Vol. 20:273
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tained that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence imposed a
special duty on the Court to clarify the application of the
privilege and that the majority's case-by-case approach in this
area of the law was inadequate in an area of the law which need-
ed clarification.54
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common
law.5 Although the privilege remains an exception to the general
rule of disclosure, 6 it has been criticized as an obstruction to full
disclosure of the truth. 7 In view of this criticism, it has been
held that the privilege must be strictly construed.58
While the privilege was developed to protect individuals, it
was assumed to be applicable to corporations as well.59 Prior to
conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assesing the legal
consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal
responses to actions that have been or may be taken by others with
regard to their conduct.
Id.
53. Id. at 403. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
54. Id. at 403-04. (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice noted that
Rule 501 provides that the courts are to "interpret" the common law principles
which govern the law of privileges. Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., concurring) See
supra note 21.
55. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 2290. The roots of the privilege
are traced to Roman Law and date back at least to 1577 as part of the English
Common-Law Doctrine. In its early stage, the privilege was thought to belong
to the attorney, who, as a matter of honor would not dislcose communications
from the client to him. It was based on the premise that an attorney's silence
was necessary to elicit the client's trust. Later, it became recognized as a
privilege of the client who, it was thought, knowing that his communications
were not subject to discovery, would be more truthful with his counsel. By mak-
ing it a privilege of the client, able to be waived only by the client, it was
thought that the interests of justice could be best served. Id.
56. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (confidential
disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal advice are
privileged).
57. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th
Cir. 1963) (the privilege is an obstruction to full and free discovery). See, e.g.,
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 2291; Note, Control Group Test Adopted as
Standard for Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege by Corporate Client, 58
WASH. U.L.Q. 1041, 1043 (1980) (the privilege is an obstruction to full disclosure
of the truth and is in contradiction of the expanded rules of discovery).
58. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 602 (while the
privilege is absolute, the adverse effect of its application on the disclosure of
truth warrants that it be strictly construed).
59. See United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. at 336(1915) (confidential communications between the railroad -and its counsel are
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1962, courts followed the general assumption that all communica-
tions by an officer or employee of the client corporation were
protected by the privilege if made in confidence without third
persons present.0 However, in 1962 the assumption that the
attorney-client privilege was available to corporations was whol-
ly rejected by a federal district court in Radiant Burners Inc. v.
American Gas Association," which held that the privilege was
totally unavailable to corporations.2  This decision, though
reversed on appeal, 3 caused the federal courts to reconsider the
assumption that corporations could avail themselves of the
attorney-client privilege. Thus, the courts sought, in light of Ra-
diant Burners, to formulate theories to justify the availability of
the privilege to corporate clients.
While the appeal in Radiant Burners was still pending, the
district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.64 addressed the
privileged, to hold otherwise would be a practical prohibition upon professional
advice and assistance); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n 320 F.2d at
323 (based on history, principle, precedent, and public policy the attorney-client
privilege in its broad sense is available to corporations).
60. See United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. at 336
(confidential communications from a railroad's employees to its counsel are
privileged); A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y.) appeal
dismissed, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952) (in the
absence of the privilege, the corporate attorney could not properly represent
his client); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357,
358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) (communications by an officer or employee of the client
corporation to the client corporations' attorney to secure legal advice are pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege if made in confidence).
61. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The district court ruled that the privilege was not
applicable to corporations; i.e., that it was a personal individual privilege. 207 F.
Supp. at 773.
62. Radiant Burners v. American Gas Ass'n., 207 F. Supp. at 773.
63. Radiant Burners v. American Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963)
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the lower court's finding was
without precedent and that the privilege had been recognized as available to
corporations for more than a century and has gone unchallenged for so long and
has been so gen~rally accepted that it must be recognized. Id. at 319-21 & n.7.
The court refused to set guidelines for applying the attorney-client privilege to
corporations. It noted that any such questions must be resolved on a case-by-
case basis by the trial judge and that his decision/method would then and only
then be subject to review by a court of appeals. Id. at 323-24.
64. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.) mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom.,
General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 943 (1963). In City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. the plaintiff
sought answers to interrogatories directed to defendant's employee. The court
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issue. The court adopted a test for applying the attorney-client
privilege which became known as the "control group test."
Deciding that the only satisfactory solution to applying the
privilege to corporations was to develop a means of determining
whether the employee making the communication personified the
corporation, the court emphasized the communicant-employees'
ability to act on the legal advice so rendered. If the
communicant-employees were not in a position to so act, or could
not at least take a substantial part in making the decision to so
act, they were considered ordinary witnesses who give informa-
tion to an attorney to enable the attorney to advise his client and
thus, their communications were not privileged."
The control group test was quickly adopted by many federal
courts as a suitable standard for applying the attorney-client
privilege to corporations." The remarkable speed of its accep-
tance prompted the Judicial Advisory Committee to Congress'
Federal Rules Committee to include it in its first draft as indica-
tive of the trend of recent decisions." In addition, several states
incorporated the test in their codification of their rules of evi-
dence while others, although judicially adopting the test as part
of their common law, did not codify it."6 Proponents of the test
claimed it was predictable, easily applied, and curtailed the crea-
tion of a "zone of silence" around corporate communications. 9
noted that the employee was advised by corporate counsel at the time of his in-
terview that any infringement on company policy would have to be reported to
management. The court therefore concluded that it was obvious that the
employee was not the client. As such, the court directed the employee to pro-
vide full and complete answers to the interrogatories. 210 F. Supp. at 484.
65. 210 F. Supp. at 485. The court stated that the work product doctrine of
Hickman v. Taylor, see supra note 10, was sufficient to protect statements
taken of non-control group employees by corporate counsel. Id.
66. See Rucker v. Wabash Ry., co. 418 F.2d 146, 154 (7th cir. 1969); Natta
v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Lipshy, 492 F.
Supp. 35, 43 (N.D. Tex. 1979; Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400-01 (E.D. Va. 1975); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon
Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35-36 (D. Md. 1974); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp. 49
F.R.D. 82, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd mem., 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973); Garrison
v. General Motors Co., 213 F. Supp. 515, 519 (S.D. Cal. 1963); American
Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Power Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962).
67. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE § 503(b)[04] (1980).
68. See Stern, Attorney-Client Privilege: Supreme Court Repudiates the
Control Group Test, 67 A.B.A. J. 1142, 1144 (1981).
69. See Note, Conflicting Standards for Applying the Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege, 33 VAND. L. REV. 999, 1003-04 (1980); Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424
(1970). See also infra note 71.
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Other courts and commentators, however, soon rejected the
control group test as a suitable solution to the dilemma of apply-
ing the attorney-client privilege to corporations. They criticized
the control group test as an attempt to equate corporations with
individual clients." Other criticisms, all of which were considered
by the Supreme Court in Upjohn, were that the test was un-
predictable and led to conflicting decisions, was difficult to apply,
discouraged the free flow of communications to legal advisors,
and hampered a corporation's efforts to comply with the law."
70. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 609 (neither the
control group test nor the subject matter test is sufficient to determine the ap-
plication of the privilege to corporations. The Diversified court proposed Judge
Weinstein's modified subject matter test). See infra text accompanying note 81;
Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970),
aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 955 (1971) (control group test
inadequate; better test is subject matter test wherein an employee's com-
munication to counsel is privileged when the employee makes the communica-
tion at the direction of his superiors and when the subject matter upon which
the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employ-
ment); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 384-86 (D.D.C. 1978) (con-
fidential communications by corporate employee to corporate counsel to enable
counsel to give the corporation legal advice are privileged even though the
employee is not a part of the "control group"); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974) (control group test provides inade-
quate protection for employee communications in that it seeks to limit the
availability of the attorney-client privilege in an artifical manner, and subject
matter test may be abused and lead to a "zone of silence"); Hasso v. Retail
Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (rejected its holding in City of Phila. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 210 F. Supp. 483 and adopted the broader formulation
of the Harper and Row subject matter test as more consistent with the policy
underlining the attorney-client privilege). See also Burnham, Confidentiality and
the Corporate Lawyer, 56 ILL. B.J. 542 (1968); Note, Privileged Communications
- Inroads On The 'Control Group' Test in the Corporate Arena, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 759 (1971) (control group test erroneously attempts to equate the cor-
porate client with the individual client and thus inhibits the free flow of infor-
mation to counsel); Comment, Corporate Self-Investigations Under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 47 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 803 (1980)(control group test is in-
adequate protection for corporations in internal investigations conducted for
self-policing purposes under the SEC); Note, Control Group Test Adopted,
supra note 57, at 1051-53 (control group test inhibits the free flow of informa-
tion from a client to its attorney, it fails to consider the realities of corporate life
by equating the corporation with the individual, and compels corporations to
resist a broad policy of self-investigation for fear that the information would be
discoverable).
71. 449 U.S. at 391-92. The Upjohn Court stated that the above short-
coming effectively defeated the purpose of the attorney-client privilege by in-
hibiting full and frank communications between a corporation and its legal ad-
visor. Id. at 392 See supra note 75.
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Then, in 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker"2
rejected the "control group" test claiming "it is not wholly ade-
quate." Instead, the court adopted two criteria to determine
when communications by corporate employees are protected: If
an employee makes communications to an attorney at the direc-
tion of his superiors and if the subject matter sought concerns
the performance of his duties as an employee, the communica-
tions are protected by the privilege." This test became known as
the "subject matter" test.
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Harper and Row
without opinion" loosened the grip that the control group test
previously had on federal and state courts even though its affir-
mation failed to provide needed precedent." Even the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which initially
propounded the control group test, rejected it and accepted the
broader standards of the Harper and Row subject matter test as
more consistent with the policy underlying the attorney-client
privilege."6 The subject matter test, however, also received
strong criticism as being highly susceptible to abuse, creating a
broad "zone of silence" around corporate affairs, and conflicting
with the new, broader discovery rules.7
72. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem. by equally divided court 400
U.S. 955 (1971). See supra note 70.
73. 423 F.2d at 491-92.
74. 400 U.S. 349 (1971).
75. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (sum-
mary actions do not have the same authority in this Court as do decisions rendered
after plenary consideration and do not present the same justification for declin-
ing to reconsider a prior decision as to decisions rendered after argument and
with full opinion); Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440
U.S. 173, 180-87 (1979)(the precedential effect of a summary affirmance can ex-
tend no farther than the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by
those actions; a summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court
below and no more may be read into a summary opinion than was essential to
sustain that judgment).
76. Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. at 428 n.4. The Hasso court simply
stated that it felt that the proper rule was announced in Harper and Row, see
supra note 70, and adopted the subject matter test. Without comment, the
court rejected its previous holding in City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
by the mere reference to it in a footnote without explanation. Hasso v. Retail
Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. at 428 n.4.
77. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 609 (subject matter
test shields too much information from the discovery process); United States v.
Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. at 42 n.6 (the subject matter test embraces too broad an
19821
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In 1978, the Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith"8 rejected the control group test as defeating the pur-
pose of the privilege by failing to take into account the realities
of corporate life and by inhibiting the free flow of information to
corporate legal advisors."9 Although the court believed that the
subject matter test provided a reasoned approach to applying
the privilege to corporations, it noted that it also has a potential
for abuse." The court, therefore, adopted the modified subject
matter test initially proposed by Judge Weinstein in his treatise
on evidence. Under the modified subject matter approach, the
attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's com-
munication if: (1) the communication was made for the purpose of
securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communica-
tion did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the
superior made the request so that the corporation could secure
legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the
communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who,
because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.8"
area and shelters too much information from discovery); Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. at 400 (subject matter test
inhibits discovery and is not as consonant with the purposes of the attorney-
client privilege as is the control group test).
See also Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients, supra note
69, at 427 (subject matter test makes the attorney the repository of corporate
information; duplication of information could not be achieved even upon inter-
viewing all employees and former employees because memories may have faded
and employees may have had time to bring their statements into conformity
with the corporate line); Note, Privileged Communications, supra note 70, at
766 (subject matter test is susceptible to abuse and unrelated to the purposes of
the attorney-client privilege); Note, Control Group Test Adopted, supra note 57,
at 1050 (subject matter test expands protection to intracorporate communica-
tions which are not deserving of protection, encourages the channeling of impor-
tant information through counsel thus making that information protected, and it
creates a broad zone of silence which is prohibitive).
78. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978). See supra note 70.
79. Id. at 608-609.
80. Id. at 609. The Diversified court felt that the subject matter test
shields too much from discovery and could result in corporations funneling all
communications through their attorneys to prevent disclosure in discovery. Id.
81. Id. See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 67, § 503(b)(04). The Diversified
court concurred with Judge Weinstein's belief that the modified subject matter
test better protects the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege and
removes from the privilege's protection any communications in which the
employee functions mainly as a fortuitous witness. 572 F.2d at 609.
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The modified subject matter test has been criticized as lacking
simplicity and objectivity, and that if narrowly construed the
test could effectively limit the privilege as much as, if not more
than, the control group test. 2
Although the facts before the Upjohn Court almost fit per-
fectly into the modified subject matter test, 3 the Court did not
adopt the test, but urged a case-by-case approach to determine
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context.' Thus, corporations and their attorneys still have no ac-
cepted guidelines to follow, and federal courts may continue to
apply any test they choose except the control group test. 5
The Court's refusal to adopt any particular test for application
of the privilege to corporate clients may be an invitation to
lower federal courts to broaden the scope of the privilege under
appropriate circumstances.8 Indeed, Rule 501 of the Federal
82. Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report
Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 699,
710-711 (1979) (modified control group test is susceptible to subjective applica-
tion and constitutes a rebellion against the main stream school of simplicity and
objectivity. If strictly construed, the modified subject matter test could ex-
clude more information from protection than a broad reading of the control
group test).
83. 449 U.S. at 396-97. In Upjohn, the Court noted that the communications
at issue were made by Upjohn employees to counsel for Upjohn acting as such,
and at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from
counsel. Information, not available from upper-echelon management was needed
to supply a basis for legal advice. The communications concerned matters
within the scope of the employees' corporate duties, and the employees
themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order
that the corporation could obtain legal advice. The communications were con-
sidered highly confidential when made and had been kept confidential by the
company. Id. at 394-95.
84. Id. at 396.
85. See supra note 75. See also Stern, supra note 68, at 1144. In contrast to
the majority's refusal to establish guidelines for the application of the corporate
attorney-client privilege, Chief Justice' Burger believed that the Court
neglected its duty to provide guidance in a case that squarely presents the
question in a traditional adversary context. See 449 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
86. See Feld, The Supreme Court in Upjohn Protects Attorney-Client
Privilege; Upholds The Work Product Doctrine. 54 J. Tax'n. 210, 213 (1981)
(Supreme Court's refusal to narrow the scope of the attorney-client privilege as
it applies to corporations was an implicit invitation to the lower courts to
broaden the privilege per Chief Justice Burger's statement that other com-
munications between employees and corporate counsel may indeed be privileg-
ed beyond those communications covered by the factual situation in Upjohn).
See 449 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Rules of Evidence was designed to provide needed flexibility.
Congress chose not to lock the courts into a set of "all or
nothing" privileges but declared that the courts should deter-
mine "in light of their reason and experience" whether or not a
privilege should be recognized in any given case."7 The Supreme
Court has concluded that the standard of Rule 501 provides the
flexibility needed to formulate new privileges as well as to de-
velop and expand existing privileges as justice requires.88
Throughout Justice Rehnquist's opinion, he stressed that if the
purpose behind the privilege is to be achieved, the attorney and
client must, with some degree of certainty, be able to predict
whether particular discussions will be protected.8 Despite this
recognition, he refused to proffer guidelines for the future appli-
cation of the privilege to corporate clients. By doing so, he ap-
parently equated flexibility with lack of guidelines. All cases,
however, whether in a federal or state court, and although decid-
ed on a case-by-case basis, are governed by guidelines such as
rules of evidence, procedure, and the common law.
Chief Justice Burger suggested qualified guidelines. 0 He openly
admitted that communications other than those considered in
Upjohn between employees and corporate counsel may be privi-
leged. However, the Chief Justice did not believe that this reali-
zation compelled the Court to prescribe guidelines for every pos-
sible future application of the privilege. He did insist, however,
that predictability does require some guidance and concurred
with Justice Rehnquist's finding that the need for predictability
is not only desirable but is essential if the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to be fulfilled. 91
Before Upjohn, the courts were in total disarray in applying
the attorney-client privilege to corporations. After Upjohn, the
disparity continues except that the control group test can no
87. 449 U.S. at 396-97. See note 21 supra
88. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The Federal Rules of
Evidence acknowledge the authority of the federal court to continue the evolu-
tionary development of testimonial privileges. Congress manifested an affir-
mative intention not to freeze the law of privilege ind to provide the courts
with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case by case basis. Id. at
47.
89. 449 U.S. at 393.
90. Id. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
91. Id. See id. at 393.
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longer be used as a judicial trap against corporations and their
counsel.92 Although Chief Justice Burger concluded that the ma-
jority's failure to delineate guidelines perpetuates that which it
condemned, 3 Upjohn, by exorcising the control group test from
the corporate judicial arena, has already been recognized as sup-
plying considerable guidance to attorneys, corporate clients,9
and the federal courts for the proper application of the privilege
to corporations. 5
Dolores Jacobs Krawec
92. Id. at 397. See Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied To
Corporate Clients, 15 Akron L. Rev. 119, 130 (1981) (Supreme Court's holding in
Upjohn is a disappointment. However, the removal of the control group test is
of some benefit and the Court's examination of the facts in Upjohn gives some
hints as to the analysis expected in the future); Stern, supra note 68, at 1146
(the Supreme Court has put federal courts back on the right track in the ap-
plication of the attorney-client privilege to corporations).
93. 449 U.S. at 404 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
94. See Feld, supra note 86, at 210.
95. See Stern, supra note 68, at 1146.

